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IMPLICATIONS OF DoD DIRECTIVE 3000
Douglas V. Johnson II

Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000: Department of Defense Capabilities for
Stability Operations (DRAFT) has now progressed through two or three iterations and
appears to be approaching formal publication. The directive could be one of the most
important documents of this decade, whether properly or improperly written and
interpreted.
Beginning with a statement of DoD policy “that Stability Operations are a core U.S.
military mission and . . . shall be accorded priority and attention comparable to combat
operations,” it is clear that what has been done since at least 1846, when Major General
Winfield Scott’s forces occupied and administered Mexico City, is about to be
formalized and more importantly resourced in meaningful terms. The thrust of the
directive’s early evolutions strongly suggests a significant commitment of resources, as
well as the extension of stability operations awareness into every campaign plan and
specifically the full development of the stability operations phase.
While the directive claims to provide “guidance on how DoD personnel and forces
plan, train, and operate to conduct and support stability operations, ” it really does
nothing more than direct the establishment of policies, the conduct of exercises and the
offer to other U.S. Government (USG) departments to “come train with us” once we
figure out what that training will be.
It directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to develop stability operations
policy, support of Department of State’s Office of Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization, and a process to facilitate intelligence sharing. The Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence is directed to extend intelligence capabilities into this realm,
while the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is directed to find
and train the right people across DoD and extend training opportunities to other U.S.
departments and agencies. Perhaps of greater importance is the charge to “develop a
joint and combined training and exercise policy for stability operations and generate
metrics on their quantity and quality, with lessons learned and with recommendations
to improve DoD stability operations capabilities.” Similar direction is given to other
Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
regional combatant commands, and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).
All this direction is worthy and essentially right-focused, but it begs several
lingering questions that matter a good deal more than detailed direction to the military
services:

a. Who will compel the appropriate members of the other departments of the USG to
participate in exercises or attend training? Unless those departments are regular
participants in stability operations exercises, little will be truly “learned” despite the
periodic publication of “Lessons Learned” pamphlets. This directive will not solve that
crucial problem.
b. Will compliance with the directive be funded by the services at the cost of
ongoing programs or will DoD make additional funding available to both JFCOM and
the services who will have to bear the greatest burden of implementation. For example,
the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is to “Ensure DoD medical
personnel and capabilities are optimally prepared to meet military and civilian health
and medical requirements in stability operations.” How is “optimally” defined and
translated into dollars for service manning, training, technical, and logistic support?
c. Are some or all of the military departments already engaged in much of this? Will
the directive foster unity or duplication of effort? Will DoD increase effectiveness in
stability operations or create inefficiencies? Will money be saved or squandered?
Certainly more questions will continue to be raised, but until those posed above are
answered satisfactorily, the resolution of other issues is beyond reach. Until then we can
expect “more of the same,” and the services will again be required to shift their own
resources about to meet this critical task of the moment. Then what will be next?
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